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Rwanda

RWANDA BRIBERY
INDEX 2023

RWANDA 500

# RWANDA BRIBERY INDEX 2023

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The Rwanda Bribery Index (RBI) is an annual publication conducted by Transparency International Rwanda (TI-RW) since 2010, with financial support from the Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) through the PPIMA Project. It aims to assess experiences and perceptions of this specific form of corruption in Rwanda and its rationale hinges on the Sustainable Development Goal 16, specifically target 16.5: "Substantially reduce corruption and bribery."

RBI findings serve as the benchmark for TI-RW's advocacy activities, aimed at influencing positive systemic change in the fight against corruption and promoting good governance in Rwanda. At this juncture, we take pride in the remarkable progress and efforts made by the government of Rwanda in the fight against corruption. This is not only depicted in RBI findings but is also evidenced by various corruption analyses and surveys such as Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), the East Africa Bribery Index (EABI), and many others.

On behalf of TI-RW, I extend my gratitude to all those who make this crucial study possible and express our thanks to citizens across the 11 districts in which the 2023 study was conducted. Regardless of their busy schedules, they actively participated in the research, providing their opinions and experiences of bribery through the administered questionnaires.

I also take this opportunity to thank the TI-RW research team, led by Albert Rwego Kavatiri, TI-Rw's Programme Manager, whose expertise and tireless efforts contributed to the success of the research.

Moreover, my sincere thanks go to TI-Rwanda's Executive Director, Mr. Apollinaire Mupiganyi, for his encouragement, guidance, and quality control throughout the research process.

Marie Immaculée Ingabire

Chairperson of Transparency Rwanda

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since 2010, Transparency International Rwanda (TI-RW) has annually published the Rwanda Bribery Index (RBI) with the aim of analyzing the experiences and perceptions of Rwandans regarding bribery incidents in the country. This 2023 report, the 14th edition, aimed to determine the prevalence (both in evidence and perception) of bribery in Rwanda, as reported by Rwandan households. It identified Rwandan institutions and organizations particularly vulnerable to bribery and assessed the impact of bribery on service delivery in Rwanda. The report also gathered concrete information on the size and share of bribes paid by Rwandan citizens when seeking access to specific services.

The survey covered all four provinces of Rwanda and the City of Kigali, involving 11 quasi-randomly selected districts with a sample size of 2,317 respondents. Both random and purposive techniques were employed, with the purposive technique allowing urban districts to be included in the sample, given their higher likelihood of providing more services than rural areas, hence posing a higher risk of corruption. The survey exclusively used a quantitative approach, and questionnaires were administered to the sampled respondents.

According to RBI 2023 findings, 50.84% of respondents (up from 39% in 2022) consider the level of corruption to be low in Rwanda, while 25.51% and 17.13% perceive that it is of medium and high levels, respectively.

Similar to previous RBI editions, the majority of Rwandans (79.35% in 2023) commend the effectiveness of the government's efforts in the fight against corruption. Compared to the previous RBI edition, the perception of effectiveness increased from 70.2% in 2022 to 79.35% in 2023.

As revealed by RBI 2023, over the last 12 months, 22% of Rwandans directly or indirectly demanded or offered a bribe in interactions with institutions. Compared to the previous edition (RBI 2022), this bribery occurrence decreased by 7.10% (from 29.10% in 2022 to 22% in 2023). This implies efforts to reduce impunity for corrupt behaviors and reflects actions taken by anti-corruption institutions to curb corruption in the country.

The survey also indicates that the private sector and the Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Authority (RURA) have registered the highest likelihood of bribery, with 15.60% and 13.80%, respectively. It is worth noting that for RURA, the likelihood sharply increased from 2.90% in 2021 to 6.00% in 2022 and further to 13.80% in 2023.

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While the national prevalence of bribery stands at 2.60% in 2023, down from 4.50% in 2022, the findings reveal that the private sector and secondary schools registered the highest prevalence of bribery, with 9.60% and 8.30%, respectively.

Illegal constructions or building and renovating houses in places not allowed by the master plan, along with obtaining a construction permit, emerge as the most prone to corruption payments in 2023, according to 52.4% and 34.9% of respondents, respectively. Moreover, the school feeding program in the Nine Years Basic Education Program is also found to be affected by corruption, as perceived by 25% of citizens participating in this survey.

Regarding bribery occurrences within the business community (SDG 16.5.1 and SDG 16.5.2), the study indicates that at least 8% of business people were demanded to pay bribes in 2023, and 5.1% of them ended up paying. Among those who paid, 42.17% did so for business purposes.

The report underscores that a low level of reporting remains among the challenges impeding the fight against corruption. The findings reveal that 94.2% did not report encountered corruption cases (up from 87.5% in 2022). The main reasons provided were that 'it did not occur to me that I should report' (32%), fear of self-incrimination (21.30%), the belief that no action would be taken even if they reported corruption (15.40%), fear of intimidation (11.50%), and not knowing where to report (4%).

The report recommends that all line institutions involved in the fight against corruption carry out customized anti-corruption awareness campaigns to combat the vice in the private sector. It further suggests establishing robust monitoring and oversight measures to combat corruption in the issuance of construction permits, promoting transparency in issuing and renewing licenses and authorizations for transport service operations. Additionally, the report recommends improving transparency and accountability, especially in the procurement of the school feeding program in the 12-Year Basic Education Program.

1. BACKGROUND

The fight against corruption is evident on Rwanda's political agenda and the country has made so much progress in this field that it is now widely considered as one of the least corrupt countries in Africa and beyond. While many corruption analyses and surveys agree on this, Rwanda's progress is best explained by the country's performance in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) where the country is now the best performer in East Africa and the 4th in the continent (Transparency International, 2022).

A key reason behind this tremendous progress is the Government's political will to fight corruption. This has been translated into the establishment of an adequate legal framework with reference to international instruments to fight against corruption. There is a need to realize that Rwanda has adopted highly encouraging laws and specific rules to fight against corruption.

Furthermore, the existence of good practices susceptible to reduce corruption risks such as the declaration of goods and patrimonies or properties of high authorities of the country and other public managers, collegiality in the public tenders and public audiences between authorities and the population, the set-up of codes of conduct by a number of public institutions, political parties and the media is another sign of firm commitment of the Government of Rwanda to efficiently fight against corruption.

In the framework of effective implementation of ZERO TOLERANCE policy to fight against corruption, one of the unconditional principles is the respect to procedures in resource management. It is in this framework that institutional audit by the Office of the Auditor General play a predominant role to reinforce transparency in the management of public funds. As a matter of fact, both politicians and civil servants have been prosecuted when allegations of corruption were brought against them, including several cases of high-ranking officials being forced to resign, dismissed or prosecuted when involved in corruption cases.

Education and public awareness on corruption is a key weapon in this fight. Government institutions, particularly the Ombudsman, have put efforts in sensitizing the population on the negative consequences of corruption and on the need to fight against it, and as a consequence large shares of citizens are now well aware of such issues. Since 2004, Transparency International Rwanda has also contributed to raise awareness in the fight against corruption by encouraging the public to denounce and condemn this malpractice

through Advocacy & Legal Aid Centres (ALAC) project and researches. It is in line with this role that the Rwanda Bribery Index was established.

The adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is a major breakthrough, with Member States explicitly recognizing the importance of promoting transparency, accountability and integrity for sustainable development. Sustainable Development Goal 16 and its targets on reducing corruption; developing effective, accountable and transparent institutions; ensuring responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making; and strengthening access to information, are not only valuable and important aspirations in their own rights to build just, peaceful and inclusive societies, they are also important conditions for the successful achievement of all the Sustainable Development Goals (UNODC, 2018).

To fight corruption more effectively, there is a need to improve comprehension of its different manifestations and to make regular, scientifically-based efforts to measure its occurrence. The development of evidence-based policies to prevent and counter corruption helps inform the public about trends and patterns of corruption and increases the accountability of Governments.

It is against this perspective that the Rwanda Bribery Index is used to examine which service providers are most involved in asking or receiving bribes, whether respondents have had to pay a bribe for a particular public service and how many times in the past year they paid a bribe as well as the amount of the bribe paid.

The above data provide an evidence-based advocacy used by Transparency International Rwanda as a local actor Civil Society involved in the fighting against corruption. As the United Nations on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2003) puts it, the fight against corruption requires the involvement of strong civil society and media. Generally, this includes both the ability to obtain and assess information about areas susceptible to corruption (transparency), and the opportunity to exert influence against corruption where it is found. This includes fora such as free communications media, which in detecting and publicly-identifying corruption, create political pressures against it, and academic and other sources which can assess the problem of corruption, assist in developing countermeasures, and provide objective assessments.

2. OBJECTIVE OF THE SURVEY

The overall objective of the study was to establish the experiences and perceptions of Rwandans with regard to service delivery and corruption in the county.

The specific objectives of the survey include:

- ❖ Determine the prevalence (evidence and perception) of corruption on Rwanda as reported by Rwandan Households;
- ❖ Identify Rwandan Institutions and Organizations particularly vulnerable to corruption;
- ❖ Assess the impact of corruption on service delivery in Rwanda;
- ❖ Gather concrete information on the size of bribes paid by Rwandan citizens while seeking to access a specific service.

3. OVERVIEW OF CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION

3.1. Introduction

Corruption is more likely to occur in countries where mechanisms of accountability are either absent or ineffective (Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 20121. According to UKaid, corruption is a phenomenon with many faces. It is characterised by a range of economic, political, administrative, social and cultural factors, both domestic and international in nature. Corruption is not an innate form of behaviour, but rather a symptom of wider dynamics. It results from interactions, opportunities, strengths and weaknesses in socio-political systems. It opens up and closes down spaces for individuals, groups, organisations and institutions that populate civil society, the state, the public sector and the private sector. It is, above all, the result of dynamic relationships between multiple actors2.

The question on why ordinary people engage in corruption or the reasons for why bureaucrats and enforcement officials ask for bribes has been a concern of researchers trying to understand why some people choose to engage in corrupt acts while others

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[1] Pelizzo, R. and F. Stapenhurst (2012), Parliamentary Oversight Tools, Routledge, London

[2] UKaid, 2015: Why corruption matters: understanding causes, effects and how to address them Evidence paper on corruption January 2015

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abstain from this behavior. For instance, Rose-Ackerman (1999:37) confirms that collusive payments to bureaucrats are used by law-violating actors as a means to avoid regulations, yet her emphasis is still on the role of government officials (in their choice of extorting such actors or not). From turning the focus to collusive actions, it follows that citizens may have incentives to instigate bribery themselves to receive the benefits from violations. With this shift in focus, it is less obvious that the official is the instigator, as it may in fact be the citizen who "acts first" in this interaction and offers a bribe to gain benefits following a legal breach.

Other researchers suggests that people in corrupt contexts know that most other people will face the opportunity of corruption and, therefore, "have no incentive to refrain from corrupt practices because even if they as individuals start behaving honestly, nothing will change" (Rothstein, 2011). Similarly, Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell (2013) conceptualize corruption as a collective action problem where an individual's expectations of how other people will act is essential. Other authors have termed such processes as "conditional corruption." They develop an argument holding that individuals justify corrupt behavior based on assessments of other peers' behavior (see Dong, Dulleck, and Torgler, 2012). This calls for anti-corruption policies to be designed with the nuanced insight that it is not only one factor that drives bribe-giving, but rather several processes. On the one hand, if bribery is driven by expectations of others' behavior, then perhaps policy needs to target precisely this factor, so that corruption does not function as a self-fulfilling prophecy, exacerbating people's acceptance of bribery (Corbacho et al., 2016). On the other, if the choice to engage in bribery is driven by the perceived gains of such acts— and especially about how officials respond—then this might require a different approach. This implies that policy that introduces uncertainty in people's perceptions about officials' tendency to respond to bribery could be a way forward. One example is staff rotation schemes that possibly challenge the status quo and the established perception of whom responds to an instigated bribe.

3.2. Causes of Corruption

Bureaucracy and Inefficient Administrative and Political Structure: There are a few main theories that suggest that higher levels of inefficiency increase the levels of corruption. First, as pointed out by Tanzi, "the existence of regulations and authorizations gives a kind of monopoly power to the officials who must authorize or inspect the activity" (Tanzi, 1998). Thus, the more regulations there are, the higher the frequency of interactions with members in the private sphere, and thus, the higher the probability that a member will engage in corrupt practices. Tanzi also points out that in an inefficient bureaucracy,

regulations tend to be less transparent (reducing accountability), and that authorizations tend to be given by specific individuals (reducing competition).

Civil Participation/Press Freedom: From a theoretic standpoint, it has been argued that the freedom of the press plays a role in the spread of anticorruption norms, as well as increasing the potential social cost of being publically shamed for corrupt behavior. Further, civil participation, in the form of democracy, can combat corruption, as regular elections give the public the option of removing corrupt politicians. Earlier empirical studies confirmed this hypothesis, stating that a long exposure to democracy predicted lower corruption (Treisman, 2000). Later studies concurred, using panel data covering 126 countries from 1980 to 2007, that both democratization and media freedom have a negative effect on corruption (Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2015)

Economic Freedom: High levels of economic freedom, or the freedom to choose how to produce, sell, and use your own resources, should in theory be associated with lower levels of corruption. With fewer economic controls, such as permit requirements, there is a lower chance that corrupt behavior is seen as necessary for engaging in business. This theory was supported by early empirical studies, which showed that increased economic freedom leads to lower corruption levels (Paldam, 2002). Later empirical studies also affirm this hypothesis; using data from the heritage foundation to measure economic freedom, it was found that there is a negative association between economic freedom and corruption (Saha et al., 2009).

Gender: From a theoretical standpoint, it has been argued that women are less individually oriented (selfish) than men (Dollar et al., 2001). In his paper, Dollar points to various studies, which have shown that women tend to exhibit more "helping" behavior, vote based on social issues, and take stronger stances on ethical behavior. It would thus follow that women would be less likely to exhibit corrupt behavior. This has largely been shown to be true in empirical studies. One empirical study shows how parliaments with a greater representation of women tend to be less corrupt (Dollar et al., 2001).

Government Structure: Theoretically, decentralization should reduce corruption. This is because decentralized governments increase competition between regions, mitigates government-induced distortions, and give individuals the option of changing district rather than engaging in corrupt practices. An early empirical study gave credence to this theory, finding that fiscal decentralization in government expenditure is strongly and significantly associated with lower corruption (Fisman and Gatti, 2002).

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Government System: A democratic system should, in theory, produce lower levels of corruption. In a democracy, individuals must be re-elected, and it thus follows that if there are regular and fair elections, there should be a lower level of corruption due to this increased accountability. This relationship was found to be empirically true in a study that hypothesized corruption to be higher in countries with weaker democratic norms and institutions (Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000).

Natural Resource Endowment: Commonly referred to as a "resource curse," many theorists have argued that having a high concentration of natural resources in a country may increase the frequency of corrupt behavior due to increased opportunity. An early empirical study found this relationship to be true, with higher levels of corruption in countries with higher abundances of natural resources (Sachs and Warner, 1997; Leite and Weidmann, 1999). Later research using data from 1980–2004 across 124 countries confirms this finding, though it also finds that the extent of the effect depends on the quality of the democratic institutions present in that country (Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010)

Poverty: From a theoretic standpoint, one would expect corruption to increase with the rate of poverty. First, poorer countries are less likely to be able to dedicate the necessary resources to building an effective legal system. Second, as Justesen and Bjornskov (2014) point out the main motivation for paying bribes in this case would be to obtain access to basic public services (such as education, water, permits, and licenses), which the government has a monopoly on, a strong motivation to break the law. This link was first hinted at in a paper that studied multiple causes and consequences of corruption (Mauro, 1998), and then later supported by empirical evidence in a multilevel regression in 18 countries that showed poor individuals are much more likely to experience having to pay bribes (Justesen and Bjornskov, 2014).

Contagion Effects: Many theorists argue that the propagation of corruption is contagious and that the level of corruption in a given country is largely dependent on the level of corruption in neighboring nations. An empirical study focused on the United States added merit to this theory and found that an increase in the levels of corruption in neighboring states of 10% led to increased levels of corruption in a state by 4%–11%, seemingly confirming the contagious nature of corruption (Goel and Nelson, 2007). Similarly, a 2008 multicounty study found that corruption can be viewed as a regional phenomenon and that any attempts at decreasing corruption in one nation will lead to decreased levels of corruption in neighboring countries (Becker et al., 2009).

Education: Theoretically higher levels of education should reduce the levels of corruption in a country. Individuals with higher levels of education tend to be more committed to civil liberties and less tolerant of government repression (Truex, 2011). Further, higher levels of education tend to lead to higher awareness of international standards, and thus in theory should reduce a person's tolerance for corruption. Initial empirical studies found that higher levels of education are correlated with lower levels of corruption (Glaeser and Saks, 2006). In a later empirical study that analyzes this relationship using data from Nepal, this hypothesis is confirmed once again (Truex, 2011).

3.3.   Effects of Corruption

Bureaucratic Inefficiency: firms that pay bribes are more likely to spend more management time with bureaucrats (Kaufman and Wei, 1999). The theory received further support after 2006 in a paper that finds the presence of corrupt officials can lead to bureaucratic delay in allocating licenses to productive individuals (Ahlin and Bose, 2007).

Economic Growth Theoretical arguments have been made for the effects of corruption on economic growth via lower levels of investment, lower quality of investment, higher levels of indirect taxation, and misallocation of resources due to distorted incentives. Large amounts of empirical studies have been published to support these theories. A paper that focused on the effects of corruption on economic growth in the United States found that states with higher levels of corruption had lower levels of economic development (Glaeser and Saks, 2006).

Foreign Direct Investment: Attempting to invest in a foreign country often requires some form of public permit. In corrupt countries it is more likely that obtaining such a permit may require a form of bribe, thus increasing the cost of engaging in such activities and reducing the overall levels of FDI. An empirical study that used data from the World Bank in 1997 found evidence to support that higher levels of corruption were significantly associated with lower levels of investment, though this relationship was much weaker when the levels of corruption were considered to be very predictable (Campos et al., 1999).

Brain Drain: Higher levels of corruption could theoretically increase a country's brain drain problems. Corruption is associated with a number of unfavorable outcomes, which might act as push factors to potential migrants. It has been argued that returns on education would be particularly affected (high levels of unemployment, lack of social advancement, slower economic growth etc.), thus those particularly sensitive to such a push factor (highly skilled individuals) would be more likely to emigrate due to this (Dimant et al., 2013).

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Human Capital: One would expect corruption to have a negative impact on human capital. Higher levels of corruption are associated with lower levels of education, health, socioeconomic development, and hence lower levels of human capital. Initial empirical evidence was found in support of this argument in a paper that, using a sample of 63 countries, found a statistically significant negative relationship between corruption indices and levels of human development (Akc¸ay, 2006)

Fiscal Deficit: Theoretically it has been argued that as corruption reduces public income (lower levels of growth, higher levels of inequality) and increases public expenditure (more inefficient spending), it thus follows that it will also increase fiscal deficits. Some initial empirical evidence to support this was found in a paper that showed that, after controlling for multiple variables, US states with higher levels of corruption have lower bond ratings, and thus taxpayers need to pay more to borrow, increasing the likelihood of fiscal deficit (Depken and Lafountain, 2006).

4. METHODOLOGY

4.1.   Approach

This survey used exclusively a quantitative approach and seek to establish the extent of bribe in Rwanda by seeking information from ordinary citizens while interacting with public officials. Furthermore, the survey used both random and purposive technique. The purposive technique enabled urban districts to be included in the sample as they are more likely to provide more services than rural areas hence, higher risk of corruption. The questionnaire was the only instrument to capture data on bribery incidences. The latter has been introduced into tablets with the kobo tool box application and it was used by well trained and skilled interviewers to collect data from Rwandan citizens aged 18 years and above.

4.2.   Sampling frame and sample size

Rwanda Bribery Index 2023 like the previous ones, is a nationwide survey. The sample size was computed on the basis of various parameters such as the desired degree of precision, target population size, timing and budget. The study population was taken from the 2022 census. The choice was due to the fact that this survey is measuring people's experience of bribery in the last 12 months. The sample is calculated using the formula below.

$\mathbf{n}$ = (N(zs/e)2)/(N-1+(zs/e)2)

Where:

$\mathbf{z}$= 1.96 for 95% level of confidence

$\mathbf{s}$ = p(1-p) where p = estimated proportion

$\mathbf{e}$ = desired margin of error

$\mathbf{N}$ = population size

In this estimation the significance level is taken as 95% with a margin of error of 2%. Such a sample size provides a base for meaningful comparison to undertake statistically valid sub stratifications that fall within acceptable confidence level. The minimum sample size is calculated on the basis of the Rao soft sample size calculator. The sample size for the RBI 2023 survey is rounded to 2,317 respondents.

Figure 1: District sample allocation

Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2023 primary data

4.3.   Data collection

The data collection was performed by skilled enumerators and team leaders recruited and trained to this end. The training covered issues such as survey methods, questionnaire structure and content, enumerator's/supervisors' responsibilities, survey ethics and the use of tablets for data collection. The questionnaire was administered to sampled respondents aged 18 years and above. For the sake of efficiency and data quality

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assurance, the questionnaire was tablet-based and relied on CsPro software. Similarly, for efficiency purpose, enumerators were requested to meet respondents in their respective households for the data collection purpose. Respondents were selected randomly based on the list availed by the head of villages included in the survey sample.

Before starting the data collection process, a "pilot survey" was organized in a sector other than those which were covered by the actual survey. The pilot survey allowed testing the research tools with regard to the clarity, wording, coherence and consistency of the questions. It also served as an opportunity for enumerators and supervisors to get used to the tools they have to use during the actual survey (especially getting used to CsPro and the use of tablets).

4.4. Quality control

In a bid to ensure data quality, the data collection activity was implemented by enumerators while team leaders and supervisors were responsible for supervision and coordination. Supervisors include TI-RW's researchers while team leaders were recruited based on their experience in carrying out such exercise. For data quality control purposes, the following measures were taken:

➢ Assessment and approval of the RBI tools and methodology by the NISR;

➢ Recruitment of skilled interviewers and supervisors

➢ Training of interviewers and supervisors

➢ Setting the questionnaire in Kobo Toolbox and introducing it into tablets

➢ Testing of the questionnaires

➢ Supervision of data collection activity

➢ Overall coordination of the field work

➢ Use of SPSS software for data analysis

➢ Data cleaning prior to analysis

4.5. Data analysis

As it has been highlighted above, quantitative data were collected using a questionnaire already set in CsPro and installed on the tablets to avoid the use of papers and the need to conduct data entry later. Data introduced in the tablets were exported in SPSS, cleaned

and analyzed by the statistician using SPSS software. In the framework of controlling all the information generated in this survey, all data were entered in the tablets as they are collected and then submitted to the national supervisor on a daily basis. This allowed monitoring the progress of the research, ensure quality and safety of data collected. The Rwanda Bribery Index is analyzed through Eight indicators with five indicators measuring the victimization of corruption and 3 perception- based indicators as follows:

1. **Likelihood =** $\dfrac{\text{\# of bribe demand situation for organization x}}{\text{\# of interactions for organization x}}$

2. **Prevalence =** $\dfrac{\text{\# of bribe payers for organization x}}{\text{\# of interactions for organization x}}$

3. **Impact =** $\dfrac{\text{\# of service deliveries as a result of bribe paying for organization x}}{\text{\# of interactions for organization x}}$

4. **Share =** $\dfrac{\text{Total amount of bribes paid in organization x}}{\text{Total amount of bribes paid in all organizations}}$

5. **Average size** $= \dfrac{\text{Total amount of bribes paid in organization x}}{\text{Individuals who paid a bribe in organization x.}}$

6. **Perceived current level of corruption**
7. **Level of government's commitment to fight corruption**
8. **Perceived causes of corruption**

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5. PRESENTATION OF THE FINDINGS

5.1. DEMOGRAPHICS

This section describes key demographic variables of the respondents who took part in this survey such as: age, gender, type of residence, level of education, employment status and income as shown in the figures below.

Figure 2: Distribution of respondents by selected demographic variables

Occupation

Self-Employed/ employed in family business or farm	Employed in private sector	Farmer	Businessman/ woman	Unemployed	Student	Employed by government/ local authority/ parastatal	Retired	Employed in community sector
22%	23.5%	21.9%	19.2%	5.2%	2.9%	2.9%	1.2%	1.10%

Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2023 primary data

It is emerged from the demographic data above that male respondents are slightly more represented than females counterpart (55.8% and 44.2% respectively). Concerning age structure, the vast majority of respondents (above 90%) are in active age. In fact, around 91.3% (cumulatively) of respondents are between 18 and 50 years old. This means that the survey questionnaire was administered to people who have been interacting with service providers seeking for services in the last 12 months.

With regard to the education attainment level, it is worth to note that around 90% of respondents have at least attained school level with the majority of them (73.5%) who have cumulatively completed the primary and secondary education. More interestingly, a mere proportion of respondents (12.6%) have not attained any education level. This is an indication that respondents who were involved in this assessment had a required capacity to understand and respond to survey questions in line with their experience in assessing how service delivery is or not affected by corruption in their respective settings.

Furthermore, the data suggest that respondents' occupation is mainly found in self-employment in family/farm related business, business and private sector related employment, while the rest are scattered in other activity sectors such as students, retired and civil servants. It is also worth noting that nearly 5.2% of respondents had no occupation by the time of data collection. Likewise, the fact that respondents were found active in different employment opportunities gives the assurance that they were well informed on how services are delivered during their interactions with service providers.

As regards the type of residence, respondents predominantly live in rural setting. In fact, 68.1% of respondents live in the said setting as opposed to 31.9% who live in cities (City of Kigali and secondary cities). The data reveals also that 54.1% of the respondents earn less than RWF 30.000 per month. This shows that citizens in the lower income category

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constitute the majority of the study' s respondents and hence were more likely exposed to encounter corruption during their interactions while seeking for services.

5.2. Perception of corruption in Rwanda 2023

In this study, the perception of corruption is examined through three dimensions including the current state of corruption, perceived causes of corruption and the perception on the effort of the government of Rwanda to fight against corruption.

5.2.1. Perception on the current state of corruption in Rwanda (2023)

On annual basis since 2010, the Rwanda Bribery index has been showing the extent to which Rwandans perceive corruption in general. This year (2023), respondents have provided their views on whether corruption in Rwanda is very low, low. medium or high.

Figure 3: Perception on the current state of corruption in Rwanda (2023)

The 2023 RBI findings suggest that corruption trend in Rwanda is perceived to shift from medium to low level as majority of respondents in this study (40.6%) believe that the state of corruption in Rwanda remains at a low level while 25.5% of them think that it is standing

at a medium level. Perceived reasons for paying bribe include mainly to speed thinks up (37.4%), It was the only way to access service (23.9%) as shown in the figure below.

Figure 4: Perceived reasons for paying bribe

The trend analysis between 2022 and 2023 reveals a positive change in terms of the actual status of corruption in Rwanda. In the previous RBI, 33.4% ascertained that the level of corruption in 2022 stood at a medium level against 27.8% who believed that corruption was at a low level. This finding is consistent with the one presented in the figure below whereby majority of respondents (56.5%) perceived that in Rwanda, corruption has decreased over the last year (see figure below).

Figure 5: Perception on whether over the past year corruption has decreased in Rwanda

Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2023 primary data

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In similar vein, the positive perception of respondents towards the decrease of corruption in Rwanda over the last 12 months is associated with increased effort by the government of Rwanda in the fight against corruption during the period under review. The section below examines the respondents' views about the effort of the Government of Rwanda in fighting corruption.

5.2.2. Respondents' views about the effort of the government in fighting against corruption in the country

The figure below illustrates the views of respondents with regard to the effort of the GoR in the fight against corruption in the last 12 months.

Figure 6: Trend on the GoR effort in the fight against corruption

Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2023 primary data

As in the previous RBI reports, the government of Rwanda is perceived to be effective in as far as the fight against corruption is concerned. This is revealed by 79.3% of Rwandans interviewed in this study. A trend analysis of the effort made by the GoR in the fight against corruption between 2021 and 2023 shows a remarkable improvement made by the

Rwandans authorities in this end. Notably, the work to prevent corruption has been emulated by sustained efforts to reduce impunity for corrupt actions of those who engage in corrupt practices. Rwanda's anticorruption machinery has continuously included prosecution of corrupt people. A regular stream of officials at all levels of government have been criminally or administratively sanctioned based on investigations and prosecutions by the National Public Prosecution Authority in close coordination with the Rwanda Bureau of Investigations.

This is evidenced by a case of a high ranking official arrested and sentenced over corruption in 2022. According to a media source, a high court in Rwanda's capital Kigali, has handed a 5-year jail term to a former State Minister in charge of Culture over corruption charges. The latter, was removed from the post in May 2022. Prosecutors accused him of using his powers as a Minister, to blackmail a local businessman in order to get graft from him. It is alleged that the Minister told to the businessman that he should give him corruption in order to help him in reopening the factory which had been closed by city council over some irregularities(Rwanda: Former Minister Transferred To Prison Over Corruption - PAN AFRICAN VISIONS)

Additionally, the Rwanda National Police has on yearly basis administered sanctions to police officers who seemingly are suspected to take bribes. In 2022 for example, about 500 police officers were sacked including those incriminated in cases of taking bribes. The 500 police officers were sacked for various crimes, including drunkenness, corruption and seeking bribes said the Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIGP) Jeanne Chantal Ujeneza during the re-launch of the police road safety campaign commonly known as Gerayo Amahoro on 8th December 2022 (Rwanda Police to Sack 500 Officers – KT PRESS).

Furthermore, in 2022, Rwanda ranked 54 (out of 180 countries) in control of corruption on Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, placing it fourth on the continent, after Seychelles, Cabo Verde and Botswana, and representing a vast improvement from 121 in 2006 (Transparency International, 2019). Rwanda has shown equally impressive improvement on Worldwide Governance Indicators control of corruption index (figure 8).

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Figure 7: CPI for Rwanda (2018 - 2022)

Figure 8: Rwanda's performance on the Control of Corruption Index, 2016 – 2021 Percentile rank among all countries

Source: World Bank, 2022

5.3.   Personal experience with bribery

Beside the perception of corruption, the Rwanda Bribery Index analyses the experience of bribes encountered by respondents in accordance with the number of their interaction with service providers. The section below describes the personal experience of respondents with bribe encountered, demanded and paid while seeking for services in selected institutions and services.

5.3.1. Bribe encountered

Bribe encountered refers to both bribes demanded and offered. The Figure 9 shows the proportion of citizens who have demanded or offered bribes while interacting with service providers in the last Twelve months.

Figure 9: Bribe encountered (2023)

Encountered bribery incidences

Demanded: 19.50%
Proposed: 2.50%
None: 78.00%

■ Demanded   ■ Proposed   ■ None

> Percentage of people who have been directly or indirectly demanded of offered bribe in an interaction with an institution in the last 12 months.

Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2023 primary data

The findings in the above figure indicates that cumulatively 22% of respondents, that is 19.5% and 2.5% of demand and proposed bribe respectively, encountered bribe in the last twelve months. The 2023 RBI shows a decrease of bribe encountered compared to the previous year (see figure 10). This implies efforts to reduce impunity for corrupt behaviors and other actions capitalized by anti-corruption institutions to curb corruption in the country which have paid off with numerous examples of a shift in norms and standards around corruption. The Rwanda National Police, the Rwanda Bureau of Investigation, Transparency International Rwanda, MPs from the African Parliamentarians Network against Corruption (APNAC), and the Office of the Ombudsman are involved in preventing corruption through sensitization campaigns.

These institutions have creatively used multiple channels to develop a sensitized citizenry. It is therefore through these channels that Rwandan citizens receive the anticorruption messages. The messages are circulated through the national anticorruption campaign organized every year around International Anticorruption Day, December 9, and African Anticorruption Day, July 11, and typically include outreach from the village to the national

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level, focus groups with young people, a conference with the Private Sector Federation, Women's Anticorruption Day, Rwanda Investigation Bureau's Anticorruption Day, Rwanda National Police's Anticorruption Day, anticorruption football matches, and radio talk shows.

In addition, institutions deliver targeted messages throughout the year, through youth organizations, the private sector federation, trainings about procurement organized by the Rwanda Public Procurement Authority, and other ad hoc events. The Office of the Ombudsman also organizes anticorruption clubs in schools and cooperates with churches for sensitization around religious events.

Figure 10: Bribe encounter trend in Rwanda (2012 – 2023)

Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2023 primary data

5.3.2. Likelihood of bribe occurrence

The likelihood of bribery refers to the extent to which bribes were demanded by service providers while interacting with service seekers in the last Twelve months. The figure below presents the national average of likelihood of bribe in Rwanda for the period 2018-2023.

Figure 11: National average of Likelihood of bribe(2018-2023)

The data from the 2023 RBI suggest that bribe demand among surveyed institutions has decreased in the last 12 months. This corroborates the results from the current perception of corruption in Rwanda which reveals that corruption will decrease over the past year according to 56.5% of respondents interviewed in this study   The study sought to examine the extent for which selected institutions are ranked in terms of demanding bribe while providing services to citizens (see figure 12).

Figure 12: Likelihood of bribe in (2023)

Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2023 primary data

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The current study reveals that the Private sector, RURA, the Police (three departments: Traffic and Road Safety + Testing and Licensing + Automobile Inspection) and the Local Government take the lead in as far as the likelihood of bribe is concerned accounting for 15.6%%, 13.8%, 11.02%, and 8.7% in 2023 respectively. This year, the top five institutions coming in the second category of those with relatively highest likelihood include Secondary school (8.6%), RSB (8.3%), Primary school (7.4%), REG (5.8%), Prosecutors (5.7%). It is worth noting that this year, RURA is ranked second in terms of the likelihood of demand bribes in the last 12 months which calls for deep analysis as to examine what is behind the increase of corruption observed in this particular public institution during the year under review. In fact, the law establishing RURA gives it a mandate to ensure that transport services are available throughout the country to meet, in transparency, all reasonable demands of all natural persons and organizations. RURA is also responsible for issuing and renewing licenses and authorizations for transport service operations, planning of routes and terminals, monitoring of service levels and enforcement of transport service regulations. However, this year, the government of Rwanda has withdrawn the responsibilities of RURA to issue licenses of public transport and has transferred this role to the City of Kigali due to failure to effectively deliver transport services and in transparent manner. According to Igihe.com RURA was alleged to monopolize tenders to few companies which failed to deliver required transport needs to citizens be it in the city of Kigali or in the country-side(RURA yambuwe inshingano zo gutanga amasoko yo gutwara abantu mu modoka rusange - IGIHE.com). The lack of transparency in issuing licenses for transport is therefore a room for corruption as the competition to get the authorization for transport service operation was very limited to favored companies.

The study sought to examine whether or not these institutions have made any effort to improve their position in terms of the control of corruption is concerned. This is shown in the figure below.

Figure 13: Comparison of likelihood of bribery between 2020-2023

Legend: ■ 2023 ■ 2022 ■ 2021

The trend analysis of the likelihood of institutions involved in the Rwanda Bribery Index shows that between 2020 and 2023 Three institutions namely RURA, Secondary School and Primary school have registered a persistent increase of likelihood of bribe since 2020. The increase of bribe incidences registered in Secondary and Primary school in Rwanda is also highlighted in another study conducted by Transparency International Rwanda on Corruption Risk Assessment in the Education sector (2023) whereby teachers have expressed their concerns with corruption risks in the procurement of food supply in primary and secondary schools as well as in the procedures of teachers transfers.

According to this study, conspiracy in procurement in schools has been reported by teachers who argue that some head teachers and other school officials have created companies in the names of other persons (beneficial ownership) and they are the ones who win tenders. This mostly affects schools under the "Nine Year Basic Education Program" in the area of school feeding program. Another malpractice that exists in the lower education sector is the transfer of teachers.

The above-mentioned report indicates that the level of corruption in the placement of teachers is very high and this really affects quality of education because teachers are fearful that they may be relocated to other schools even if they have not requested for that. It was said that recently, NESA sent a teacher to a school but after two weeks the district informed him that he had to go to another school far from the city. Apparently, only wives of rich people, high officials or those who paid bribes are the ones who are sent to teach in schools located in the city. Others are sent far in the countryside.

5.3.3. PREVALENCE OF BRIBERY

This section provides the probability of paying bribes (prevalence) to service providers in Rwanda while interacting with the service seekers in the last 12 months. The figure below presents the outcome.

Figure 14: Prevalence of Bribe in Rwanda (2018 – 2023)

Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2023 primary data

As for the likelihood, the prevalence of bribe in Rwanda has decreased from 4.5% in 2022 to 2.6% in 2023, implying a consistent effort by the existing anti-corruption machinery to reduce corruption in the country on both demand and payment of bribes. The figure below displays institutions with the highest prevalence of bribe in the year under review (see figure 15).

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Figure 15: Institutions with the highest prevalence of bribe in the last 12 months

Institution	Prevalence
Private sector	9.60%
Secondary schools	8.30%
RNP: Traffic and Road Safety + Testing and Licensing + Automobile Inspection	7.50%
Primary school	7.40%
RURA	6.90%
Local Gov	5.08%
RSB	4.80%
WASAC	4.30%
TVET	4.20%
REG	3.90%
Prosecutors	2.90%
RIB	2.70%
Judges	2.70%
Local CSOs	1.69%
RRA	1.40%
Banks	0.90%
Universities	0.60%
Medical services	0.10%

In the **private sector**:

Areas most affected are recruitment, procurement and construction

Prevalence of bribe: The number of bribe payments made divided by all interactions registered (per institution)

Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2023 primary data

The 2023 RBI shows the institutions that are most prone to bribes payment than others including the Private Sector (9.6%), Police's three departments: Traffic and Road Safety + Testing and Licensing + Automobile Inspection (9.2%), Secondary schools (8.3%), Primary schools (7.4%) and RURA (6.9%). Interestingly, those institutions with the highest likelihood are found to be the ones with the highest prevalence of bribe in 2023 in Rwanda. This calls for appropriate anti-corruption measures targeting these institutions with highest levels of corruption. The RBI sought to also analyze the trend of prevalence of bribes among institutions for the period between 2021 and 2023. This is shown in the figure 16.

Figure 16: Trend of the prevalence of bribe in selected institutions (2020 – 2023)

Institution	2023	2022	2021
Private Sector	9.60%	10.20%	9.78%
Secondary schools	8.30%	5.04%	1.16%
RNP: Traffic and Road Safety + Testing and Licensing + Automobile Inspection	7.50%	8.30%	7.60%
Primary school	7.40%	4.50%	0.43%
RURA	6.90%	4.00%	0.00%
Local Government	5.08%	6.50%	4%
RSB	4.80%	3.60%	4.35%
WASAC	4.30%	6.50%	3.28%
TVET	4.20%	5.10%	2.44%
REG	3.90%	6.70%	2.82%
Prosecutors	2.90%	6.30%	2.33%
RIB	2.70%	4.20%	1.21%
Judges	2.70%	3.90%	3.43%
Local CSOs	1.69%	2.30%	0.00%
Banks	0.90%	1.20%	0.49%
Universities	0.60%	1.50%	1.56%
Medical services	0.10%	1.50%	0.27%

■ 2023 ■ 2022 ■ 2021

Source: Adapted from TI-Rwanda RBI 2023 primary data

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The figure above shows a mixed trend of the prevalence of bribe payments in selected institutions in Rwanda. It is therefore worth noting that majority of institutions have lowered their levels of bribe payments compared to the previous year and only Four institutions have increased their levels of prevalence of bribes in the last 12 months. These include Secondary and Primary schools, RURA and RSB. The fact that majority of surveyed institutions (around 76% of them) got reduced scores in terms of bribes payments in the last 12 months, it is a good indication of the efforts made by government of Rwanda to combat this malpractice. The services for which most of bribe payment was made are discussed in the figure below.

Figure 17: Services with highest bribe payment in 2023

Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2023 primary data

Illegal constructions or build, renovate houses in places that are not allowed by the Master Plan and getting a construction permit emerge as most prone to corruption payments in 2023 according to 52.4% and 34.9% of respondents respectively. This corroborates a study on corruption risks and business ethics in private sector in Rwanda (OoO, 2023) which

revealed that corruption prevalence in construction in Rwanda remained to be highest at 24.4%. Perception and experience of corruption in construction related services emerged from different procedural aspects such acquisition of construction permit and ad hoc work supervisions.

School feeding program in Nine Years Basic Education program is equally found to be affected by corruption as perceived by 25% of citizens who participated in this survey.

In the section below, this study sought to avail data on the prevalence of bribes among business people for the sake of enabling the monitoring of the SDG16.5. The data in the figure 18 reveal that the proportion of bribe demand and paid among the business community in 2023 in Rwanda stands at 8% and 5.1% respectively. The study indicates that of the 5.1% of the business people who paid bribe in the last 12 months, 42.17% of them paid it for business purposes.

Figure 18: Bribe occurrences among the business community (SDG16.5.1 and SDG 16.5.2)

Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2023 primary data

Figure 19: Trend of prevalence and likelihood of bribe among business people – SDG 16.5

Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2023 primary data

5.4.   AVERAGE AMOUNT OF BRIBE PAID IN 2023

The data below shows the average amount of bribe paid during the last 12 months by respondents who sought services in the selected institutions.

Table 1: Average amount of bribes paid

Institutions	Average size of bribe (RWF)
RIB	282,968
Prosecutors	200,000
Judges	153,000
RBS	100,000
BANKS	88,450
Local Government	69,809
RRA	66,636
WASAC	49,000
Traffic Police	42,945
TVET	25,000
PRIVATE SECTOR	23,444
REG	21,666
RURA	14,000
University	10,000
Primary school	6,666
Secondary school	5,250
National Average	**70,633**

16 citizens collectively paid RWF 4,527,500 to RIB staff. 85.3% (amounting to RWF 3,860,000) was paid to secure release from detention.

Prosecutors:
1 person paid RWF 200,000 to a prosecutor to avoid filing a case in court

Judges:
6 people collectively paid RWF 920,000, with RWF 570,000 specifically paid to secure the nearest hearing date.

In general, the total amount of bribe paid in 2023 has decreased from Rfw38,352,563 in 2022 to Rwf22,814,500 in 2023

**Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2023 primary data**

The national average of the amount of bribe paid by respondents is amounted to Rfw 70.633 implying a decrease of the national average of bribe paid from the previous year which was higher (Rfw 97.341). This also applies for the total amount of bribe paid in 2023 whereby the total amount paid in the last 12 months has decreased from Rfw14,126,000 in 2022 to Rfw 22.814.500. The figures below show the trend of the average amount of bribe paid in the last 6 years and the total amount paid in the last 12 months since 2021.

Figure 20: Average amount of bribes (Rwf) paid in the last 12 months (2016 – 2023)

Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2023 primary data

*Figure 21: Total amount paid in the last 12 months (2021 – 2023)*

Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2023 primary data

5.5.   SHARE OF BRIBE 2023

The share of bribe in paid to service providers in 2023 is presented in the figure 22. It shows institutions with the large share of bribes during the last 12 months as perceived by respondents who were asked to pay bribe while seeking for service.

Figure 22: Share of bribe



Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2023 primary data

As shown by the data in the figure above, the large share of bribe paid in 2023 originates from the Local Government (45%), RIB (20%) and Police – three departments: Traffic and Road Safety + Testing and Licensing + Automobile Inspection (10%) which together had

received 75% of bribe paid in all the selected institutions for RBI 2023. The main reason of large shares in Local Government, RIB and Police are related to bribes paid to get construction permit, being released from prison as discussed earlier in this study (see figure 17 and table 1).

5.6.   PERCEIVED IMPACT OF BRIBE 2023

The figure below presents findings on whether respondents have been denied the services they requested for as a result of refraining to pay a bribe.

Figure 23: Impact of bribe

Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2023 primary data

Overall, the perceived impact of bribe in Rwanda stands at 2.7%, meaning that around 3 in Ten who sought for service in the selected instructions and who refrained from paying bribes to get a service ended up being refused the requested services. As it has been shown in the previous RBI reports since 2010, the trend analysis of the perceived impact of bribe indicates that in Rwanda getting services is not necessarily associated to paying bribes (perceived impact of bribe in Rwanda since 2010 always scored very low (below 3%). However, the 2023 RBI shows that the impact of bribe in RURA, RBS and Private sector remain with the highest impact of bribe (between 7 and 5 %) in the year under review. This finding therefore indicates that in these institutions getting a service is to some extent associated with paying bribe.

5.7. REPORTING CORRUPTION

In this section, the reporting of bribe cases is illustrated and discussed. The survey shows whether the respondents who encountered corruption reported it or not (see Figure 24).

Figure 24: Reporting corruption

94.2% didn't report corruption cases encountered

From 87.5% in 2022

Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2023 primary data

As in the previous RBI, the above figure indicates that the vast majority (94.2%) of respondents who encountered bribes did not report it. As described in the figure 25, the main reasons were that "it did not occur to me that I should report (32%), Fear of self-incrimination (21.3%), and that they knew no action would be taken even if they reported corruption (15.4%). These reasons are likely to affect the existing efforts aimed to fight against corruption if nothing is done to address the identified main reasons of not reporting corruption in Rwanda.

Figure: Reasons for not reporting corruption

32%	21.30%	15.40%	12.10%	11.50%	4%	3.70%
Did not occur to me that I should report	Fear of self incrimination	I knew that no action would be taken even if I reported	The institution, official, person where I would report are also corrupt	Fear of intimidation	Didn't know where to report	Other

Source: TI-Rwanda RBI 2023 primary data

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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This Rwanda Bribery Index is an unnual survey that aims to analysing the experience and parception of Rwandans with regard to bribe incidences in the country. The study uses mainly the quantitative approach to collect data from a national representative sample of respondents aged beyond 18 years in Eleven districts of Rwanda.

The 2023 RBI indicates that the perception of corruption has decreased from 2022 and that the majority of respondents believe their government is effectively fighting corruption. With regard to the experience of bribe, the 2023 RBI shows a decrease of bribe encountered compared to the last year. The current study also reveals that the Private sector, RURA and the Police's three departments (Traffic and Road Safety + Testing and Licensing + Automobile Inspection) took the lead in as far as the likelihood of bribe is concerned.

A trend analysis of the prevalence of bribe in Rwanda between 2019 and 2023 indicates that corruption has increased for the last Five years from 2.08% in 2018, 2% in 2019, 2,5% in 2020, 2,3% in 2021 to 4.5% in 2022 and has only decreased in 2023. This is consistent with the high level confidence of respondents who believe that the government of Rwanda has doubled its efforts to effectively fighting corruption.

The national average of the amount of bribe paid by respondents is amounted to Rfw 70.633 implying an decrease from the previous year which was higher (Rfw 97.341). This also applies for the total amount of bribe paid in 2023 which has decreased from Rfw 38.352.563 in 2022 to Rfw 22.814,500. The large share of bribe paid in 2023 originates from the Local Government (45%), RIB (20%) and Police's three departments – Traffic and Road Safety + Testing and Licensing + Automobile Inspection (10%) which together had received 75% of bribe paid in all the selected institutions for RBI 2023.

As in the previous RBI, the vast majority (94.2%) of respondents who encountered bribes did not report. The main reasons were that "it did not occur to me that I should report (32%), Fear of self-incrimination (21.3%), and that they knew no action would be taken even if they reported corruption (15.4%). These reasons are likely to affect the existing efforts aimed to fight against corruption if nothing is done to address the identified main reasons of not reporting corruption in Rwanda.

Based on RBI 2023 findings , TI-Rwanda propose the following recommendations to relevant institutions or actors.

Issue	Recommendation	Concerned actors
Private sector on top of the list of Institutions most prone to corruption since 2021	✓ Carry out customised anti-corruption awareness campaigns in activity sectors and business areas most vulnerable to corruption such as procurement and recruitment ✓ Establish a specialised mechanism (for instance a department or a directorate) in charge of monitoring and fighting corruption in Private Sector	PSF , OoO , CSOs , Citizens
Issuing construction permit on top of services that are most prone to corruption in Local Government	✓ Establish strong monitoring and oversight measures that provide information needed to hold concerned civil servants to account ✓ Staff rotation in jobs that are vulnerable to corruption such as construction is expected to assist in preventing corrupt relationships from forming and in disrupting established corrupt relationships	Local Government MINALOC, Media, CSOs, citizens
Significant Increase of levels of corruption in issuing and renewing licenses and authorizations for transport service operations in RURA	✓ Promote transparency in Human resources management: The rules and procedures in staff	RURA, MIFOTRA, RIB, NPPA, OoO

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	recruitment, promotion should be observed ✓ Sustained efforts to prosecute corrupt actions of those who engage in corrupt practices	
Increased levels of corruption in school feeding program in 12 YBE Program	✓ Speed up the process of optimizing e-service delivery to minimize physical contacts in procurement process in all NBAs including Primary and Secondary schools ✓ Establish tender committees that include representatives of students and parents and ensure that they are involved and participate in all procurement phases	MINEDUC, MINALOC, Local Government, RPPA
Very Low rate of reporting corruption by victims	✓ Strengthen corruption reporting systems and whistle-blowers' protection	Office of the Ombudsman, NPPA, RIB, TI-Rw
	✓ Reinforce the public awareness on evils of corruption and encourage them to resist it and report corrupt behaviors	Office of the Ombudsman, NPPA, RIB, TI-Rw, Citizens

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